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ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to analyze whether
a number of firm and industry characteristics, as well as
media exposure, are potential determinants of corporate
social responsibility (CSR) disclosure practices by Spanish
listed firms. Empirical studies have shown that CSR dis-
closure activism varies across companies, industries, and
time (Gray et al., Accounting, Auditing & Accountability
Journal 8(2), 47–77, 1995; Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting 28(3/4), 327–356, 2001; Hackston and Milne,
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 9(1), 77–108,
1996; Cormier and Magnan, Journal of International Finan-
cial Management and Accounting 1(2), 171–195, 2003; Cor-
mier et al., European Accounting Review 14(1), 3–39, 2005),
which is usually justified by reference to several theoretical
constructs, such as the legitimacy, stakeholder, and agency
theories. Our findings evidence that firms with higher
CSR ratings present a statistically significant larger size and
a higher media exposure, and belong to more environ-
mentally sensitive industries, as compared to firms with
lower CSR ratings. However, neither profitability nor
leverage seem to explain differences in CSR disclosure
practices between Spanish listed firms. The most influen-
tial variable for explaining firms’ variation in CSR ratings is
media exposure, followed by size and industry. Therefore,
it seems that the legitimacy theory, as captured by those
variables related to public or social visibility, is the most
relevant theory for explaining CSR disclosure practices of
Spanish listed firms.
KEY WORDS: corporate social responsibility disclosure,
Spain
Introduction
Over the last few decades there has been a growing
public awareness of the role of corporations in
society. Many of the firms which have been credited
with contributing to economic and technological
progress have been criticized for creating social
problems. Issues such as pollution, waste, resource
depletion, product quality and safety, the rights and
status of workers, and the power of large corpora-
tions have become the focus of increasing attention
and concern. In this context, companies have been
increasingly urged to become accountable to a wider
audience than shareholder and creditor groups. As a
matter of fact, public awareness and interest in
environmental and social issues and increased
attention in mass media have resulted in more social
disclosures from corporations in the last two decades
(Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Gray et al., 1995;
Hooghiemstra, 2000; Kolk, 2003). In the European
Union context, the publication of the Green Paper
(2001) by the European Commission launched a
wide debate on how the EU could promote cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR). Although there is
still no universal definition of CSR (Godfrey and
Hatch, 2007), most definitions describe it as a con-
cept whereby companies integrate social and envi-
ronmental concerns in their business operations and
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a
voluntary basis. By acting in a responsible way to the
variety of social, environmental, and economic
pressures, companies respond to the expectations of
the various stakeholders with whom they interact,
such as employees, shareholders, investors, con-
sumers, public authorities, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
Companies usually inform of their CSR activities
in the annual report or in separate social reports
(CSR Report or Sustainability Report). However,
there is no standardization or uniformity in terms
of the items reported, or the way of reporting.
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Consequently, various NGOs have started devel-
oping models or frameworks for reporting on CSR,
such as the ISO 14001 (Internationally Standards
Organization), World Resources Institute (WRI)
and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).
With regard to the empirical research on CSR,
three types of empirical studies characterize the
research in this field. The first one relates to
‘descriptive studies,’ which report on the nature and
extent of CSR with some comparisons on countries
and periods. The second one is related to ‘explicative
studies,’ which focus on the potential determinants
of social and environmental reporting. The third one
is interested in the ‘impact of social and environ-
mental information’ on various users, mainly on
market reaction. Our study adopts the second
orientation, as it is focused on analyzing whether a
number of firm and industry characteristics, as well
as media exposure, are potential determinants of
CSR disclosure practices by Spanish listed firms.
Empirical studies have shown that CSR disclosure
activism varies across companies, industries, and time
(Gray et al., 1995, 2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996).
They have also shown this behavior to be impor-
tantly and systematically determined by a variety of
firm and industry characteristics that influence the
relative costs and benefits of disclosing such infor-
mation (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Cormier and
Magnan, 2003; Cormier et al., 2005; Hackston and
Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002a, b).
This paper is focused on the Spanish setting for
three reasons. First, most of the present literature is
based on Anglo-American countries (US and UK)
and evidence should be added about other institu-
tional contexts. Second, there is scarce empirical
research on CSR determinants by Spanish compa-
nies. Previous studies (Archel, 2003; Archel and
Lizarraga, 2001; Carmona and Carrasco, 1988; Garcı
´a-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003; Moneva and Llena,
1996, 2000) have mainly focused on one dimension
of CSR such as environmental disclosure, and the
sample periods analyzed in these papers were
previous to the first compulsory regulations in Spain
in the area of environmental disclosure (i.e., the
Royal Decree 437/1998 and the Resolution enacted
on March 25, 2002 by the Institute of Accounting
and Auditing – ICAC-). Our sample period follows
the previous mandatory regulations and also the GRI
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, which have
been generally adopted by Spanish listed firms in the
last years as the benchmark for CSR reporting. As a
result, CSR disclosures by Spanish firms in our
sample period are much more richer and extensive as
compared to previous studies in the Spanish context
in which that information was very scarce and
anecdotical. Moreover, our measure of CSR not
only captures environmental issues but also a number
of social aspects included in the latest developments
in CSR worldwide, specially those stemming from
the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and the
United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights. Third, in
contrast to the understanding of CSR from common
law English-speaking countries (Australia, Canada,
UK, US), the determinants of CSR in Continental
Europe are still relatively unknown. Therefore, our
main goal is to analyze whether the specific features
of Spain regarding its capital market and companies’
financing structure result in a significant difference
between the factors influencing CSR disclosure
practices of Spanish listed firms when compared to
firms from other different institutional contexts. In
particular, Spain is less capital market oriented than
other EU countries and financing policies are bank
oriented.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In the following section, the theoretical
framework used is presented. Section ‘‘Determinants
of CSR disclosure: development of hypotheses’’
discusses the determinants of CSR disclosure prac-
tices. Section ‘‘Data and method of estimation’’
focuses on the methodology and data. Section
‘‘Results’’ presents the main results of our empirical
analysis. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
A multi-theoretical framework for CSR
disclosure
Despite widespread academic and business interest in
the issue, a comprehensive theoretical framework of
the underlying determinants of corporate social and
environmental reporting is still elusive. The empir-
ical investigations of CSR practices have produced a
very diverse body of academic literature which
engages different theoretical perspectives in support
of corporate social reporting, such as the agency
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theory, the legitimacy theory, and the stakeholder
theory, among others.
For instance, there is extensive evidence that
social and environmental information is useful
for decision-making by financial stakeholders
(Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997; Blacconiere and
Patten, 1994; Graham et al., 2000; Richardson and
Welker, 2001). However, with its financial stake-
holders’ focus, it fails to provide a comprehensive
theoretical foundation to explain CSR disclosure,
especially since most of that disclosure is non-
financial. In response to this conceptual gap, other
alternative explanations for CSR disclosure have also
been offered in the literature. Following its emer-
gence as an explanatory model for corporate finan-
cial reporting (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986),
economic agency theory (or positive accounting the-
ory) became an appealing proposition as a rationale
for CSR disclosure (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989).
Agency theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts
between various economic agents who act oppor-
tunistically within efficient markets. In this context,
social and environmental disclosure may prove use-
ful in determining debt contractual obligations,
managerial compensation contracts, or implicit
political costs. However, as indicated by Cormier et
al. (2005), agency theory’s focus on monetary or
wealth considerations among agents who trade in
informationally efficient markets does limit the scope
of relevant social and environmental disclosure as
well as its intended purpose, insofar as many
potential users of this kind of information may not
act in these markets at all (e.g., pressure groups such
as Greenpeace).
In contrast to agency theory, the legitimacy theory
provides a more comprehensive perspective on CSR
disclosure as it explicitly recognizes that businesses
are bound by the social contract in which the firms
agree to perform various socially desired actions in
return for approval of their objectives and other
rewards, and this ultimately guarantees their con-
tinued existence (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Dee-
gan, 2002; Guthrie and Parker, 1989). Gray et al.
(1995) a n d  H o o g h i e m s t r a
( 2000), among others, argue that most insights into
CSR disclosure ema-nate from the use of this
theoretical framework which posits that social and
environmental disclosure is a way to legitimize a
firm’s continued existence or operations to the
society. Perrow (1970) defines
legitimacy as a generalized perception or assumption
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system
of norms, value, beliefs, and definitions. Although
firms have discretion to operate within institutional
constraints, failure to conform to critical, institu-
tionalized norms of acceptability can threaten the
firm’s legitimacy, resources, and, ultimately, its sur-
vival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991;
Scott, 1987). Meyer and Rowan (1977) assert that: ‘as
the issues of safety and environmental pollution arise,
and as relevant professions and programs become
institutionalized in laws, union ideologies and public
opinion, organizations incorporate these programs
and professions’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 345).
Jennings and Zandbergen (1995) argue that the type
of institutional pressure, be it coercive, mimetic, or
normative, influences the rate at which sustainable
development practices diffuse among firms.
Reinforcing the previous arguments, many prior
studies on corporate disclosures have provided
evidence that firms do voluntarily disclose
information in their annual reports as a strategy to
manage their legitimacy (Campbell, 2000; Deegan
and Rankin, 1996; Hutchings and Taylor, 2000; Nasi
et al., 1997; Patten, 1991; Woodward et al., 2001).
Thus, CSR disclosure can be viewed as a constructed
image or symbolic impression of itself that a firm is
conveying to the outside world to control its
political or economic position (Neu et al., 1998).
Finally, the stakeholder theory explicitly considers
the expectations impact of the different stakeholder
groups within society upon corporate disclosure
policies. Under the managerial branch of stakeholder
theory, the central thesis that emerges is that cor-
porate disclosure is a management tool for managing
the informational needs of the various powerful
stakeholder groups (employees, shareholders, inves-
tors, consumers, public authorities and NGOs, …). 
Managers use information to manage or manipulate
the most powerful stakeholders in order to gain their
support which is required for survival (Gray et al.,
1996). In relation to the overlap between legitimacy
theory and stakeholder theory, Deegan (2002,
p. 295) state that ‘‘both theories conceptualise the
organisation as part of a broader social system
wherein the organisation impacts, and is impacted
by, other groups within society. Whilst legitimacy
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theory discusses the expectations of society in gen-
eral (as encapsulated within the ‘social contract’),
stakeholder theory provides a more refined resolu-
tion by referring to particular groups within society
(stakeholder groups). Essentially, stakeholder theory
accepts that because different stakeholder groups will
have different views about how an organisation
should conduct its operations, there will be various
social contracts ‘negotiated’ with different stake-
holder groups, rather than one contract with society
in general. Whilst implied within legitimacy theory,
stakeholder theory explicitly refers to issues of
stakeholder power, and how a stakeholder’s relative
power impacts their ability to ‘coerce’ the organi-
sation into complying with the stakeholder’s
expectations.’’
While there are some similarities, the previous
three alternative theories essentially differ on the
basis of fundamental assumptions. Unlike the agency
or positive accounting theory, legitimacy theory and
stakeholder theory make no assumption of rational,
wealth-maximizing individuals operating within the
environment of efficient capital markets. On the
other hand, while Woodward et al. (1996) have
shown that both legitimacy theory and stakeholder
theory consider an organization to be part of the
wider social system, legitimacy theory looks at
society as a whole, whereas stakeholder theory
recognizes that some groups within the society are
more powerful than others. We posit that the
alternative theories which are of value in studies of
CSR disclosure policies focus upon distinct per-
spectives of the same issue. Hence, the different
theories outlined should not be seen as competing
perspectives, but rather as alternative ways of com-
prehending and studying organizational decisions to
disclose different kinds of information to the public.
Determinants of CSR disclosure:
development of hypotheses
Empirical studies have shown that CSR disclosure
activism varies across companies, industries, and time
(Gray et al., 1995, 2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996).
They have also shown this behavior to be impor-
tantly and systematically determined by a variety of
firm and industry characteristics that influence
the relative costs and benefits of disclosing such
information (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Cormier
and Magnan, 2003; Cormier et al., 2005; Hackston
and Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002a, b). The theories that
seem to have been most successful in explaining the
content and extent of social and environmental
reporting are system-oriented theories, above all
legitimacy and stakeholder theories (Gray et al., 1995;
Milne, 2002). According to these theories, social
disclosure is in first hand used in order to guard
corporations’ reputation and identity (Hooghiemstra,
2000). Both Adrem (1999) and Cormier et al. (2005)
argue, however, that disclo-sures are a complex
phenomenon that cannot be explained by one single
theory. As pointed out by Gray et al. (1995), if the
aim of the study is to ex-plain an empirical
phenomenon, it could be a problem when theories
are looked upon as com-petitive instead of
complementary. Hence, in this study we have an
eclectic approach and use a multi-theoretical
framework in order to explain the dif-ferences in
CSR disclosure practices between Spanish listed
firms. Next, we discuss each of the explanatory
factors analyzed.
Size
The public pressure perspective of legitimacy theory
is concerned with public and, consequently, gov-
ernment intrusions into the activities of organiza-
tions that are deemed to violate their social contract.
This perspective parallels Watts and Zimmerman’s
(1986) political cost hypothesis in that larger com-
panies are deemed to be more highly exposed to
public scrutiny. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue
that large companies are more visible to the public,
have more market power, and are more newswor-
thy. Hence, they are more likely to be subject to
public resentment, consumer hostility, militant
employees, and the attention of government regu-
latory bodies. Large corporations do have a bigger
effect on the community, and therefore normally
have a bigger group of stakeholders that influence the
corporation (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Knox et al.,
2006). Hence, voluntary disclosures can be explained
as an effort to avoid regulations and reduce political
costs (Adams et al., 1998; Clarke and Gibson-Sweet,
1999; Gray et al., 1995; Ness and Mirza, 1991).
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) argue that
Carmelo Reverte
larger firms are more politically visible, thus they are
expected to engage more heavily in legitimating
behavior. From an empirical perspective, various
studies have found that there is a positive relation-
ship between CSR disclosure and firm size or
political visibility (Adams et al., 1998; Cullen and
Christopher, 2002; Hamid, 2004; Haniffa and
Cooke, 2005; Hossain et al., 1995; Neu et al., 1998;
Patten, 1991). Hence, the discussion above leads us to
the hypothesis that:
H1: There is a positive significant relationship
between firm size and CSR disclosure.
Industry sensitivity
In previous research, industry, together with size, is
the most common variable in order to explain the
content and extent of social and environmental dis-
closures (Adams et al., 1998; Cowen et al., 1987;
Gray et al., 1995). The results from these studies
show that corporations from industries whose
manufac-turing process has a negative influence on
the environment disclose and report considerably
more information than corporations from other
industries. In general, corporations from the mining,
oil, and chemical industries emphasize information
regarding environmental, health, and safety issues
(Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 1999; Jenkins and
Yakovleva, 2006; Line et al., 2002; Ness and Mirza,
1991), while the finance and service industries in
general seem to report more regarding social issues
and philanthrop-ical deeds (Clarke and Gibson-
Sweet, 1999; Line et al., 2002). A body of empirical
literature associates the metals, resources, paper and
pulp, power gener-ation, water, and chemicals
sectors with high envi-ronmental impacts (Bowen,
2000; Hoffman, 1999; Morris, 1997). In contrast,
other industries, particu-larly newer manufacturing
industries and the service sector, have significantly
lower environmental impacts and are associated with
fewer visible envi-ronmental issues. Therefore,
companies in these industries are expected to be
subject to significantly less stakeholder pressure
regarding their environ-mental performance, and so
would be expected to display a lesser degree of
disclosure activism. Hence, the discussion above leads
us to the hypothesis that:
H2: There is a positive significant relationship be-
tween industry environmental sensitivity and
CSR disclosure.
Profitability
There are several studies, mainly based on the
stakeholder theory, that suppose a positive relation-
ship between social disclosure policy and profit-
ability (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Cowen et al.,
1987; Ismail and Chandler, 2005; Roberts, 1992;
Ullmann, 1985), although it should be noted that the
empirical results do not always confirm that positive
relationship (Archel, 2003; Brammer and Pavelin,
2008; Carmona and Carrasco, 1988; Garcı´a-Ayuso
and Larrinaga, 2003; Moneva and Llena, 1996;
Roberts, 1992). According to Belkaoui and Karpik
(1989), the underlying cause of a positive relation-
ship between social disclosure policy and profit-
ability is management’s knowledge. A management
that has the knowledge to make a company profit-
able also has the knowledge and understanding of
social responsibility, which leads to more social and
environmental disclosures. In the context of the
agency and political cost theories, Giner (1997)
points out that management in very profitable
corporations provide more detailed information in
order to support their own position and compensa-
tion. Ng and Koh (1994) point to the fact that
profitable corporations are more exposed to political
pressure and public scrutiny, and therefore use more
self-regulating mechanisms, for instance voluntary
disclosure of information, in order to avoid regula-
tion. The most obvious and explicit explanation
might be that profitable corporations have the nec-
essary economical means – the so-called organiza-
tional slack (Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston and
Milne, 1996; Pirsch et al., 2007). In a corporation
with less economical resources, management will
probably focus on activities that have a more direct
effect on the corporation’s earnings than the pro-
duction of social and environmental disclosures
(Roberts, 1992; Ullmann, 1985). However, from a
legitimacy theory perspective, profitability can be
regarded to be either positively or negatively related
to CSR disclosure (Neu et al., 1998). As these
authors point out, where the organization is
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profitable, environmental disclosures would, for
those stakeholders who value the environment, give
confirmation that profit has not been at the expense
of the environment. Conversely, in periods of rela-
tive unprofitability, these same disclosures might be
either directed at convincing financial stakeholders
that current environmental investments will result in
long-term competitive advantages or at distracting
attention from the financial results. Thus, we do
not make any a priori assumption about the sign
of the association between CSR disclosure and
profitability.
H3: There is a significant relationship between
profitability and CSR disclosure.
Ownership structure
The degree to which ownership of company stock is
concentrated in the hands of a few large investors or
dispersed among many has been proposed as an
influence on disclosure policy (Roberts, 1992;
Ullmann, 1985). Opportunistic management
behavior and conflict of interests between agents and
principals are more likely to occur in corporations
with more dispersed ownership. In a widely held
company, voluntary disclosure can act as a bonding
and monitoring tool reducing agency conflicts
between managers and shareholders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Evidence suggests that ownership
dispersion across many investors contributes to
increased pressure for voluntary disclosure (Cullen
and Christopher, 2002; Ullmann, 1985). Hence,
corporations with many owners are in general
expected to disclose more information than corpo-
rations with concentrated ownership in order to
reduce information asymmetries between the orga-
nization and its shareholders (Prencipe, 2004). Firms
whose shares are widely held are more likely to
improve their financial reporting policy by using
their CSR disclosure in order to reduce these
asymmetries. On the contrary, firms with a con-
centrated ownership structure are less motivated to
disclose additional information on their CSR, insofar
as the shareholders of these firms can obtain infor-
mation directly from the firm. Reinforcing the
previous arguments, Brammer and Pavelin (2008)
evidence, in the context of environmental infor-
mation, that having greater ownership concentration
makes a firm less likely to disclose an environmental
policy. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H4: There is a negative relationship between CSR
disclosure and concentrated ownership.
International listing
According to Cooke (1989), when a firm is listed on
a foreign exchange, it will disclose more detailed
information since it may need to observe the disclo-
sure rules of two or more stock exchanges, and it will
attract more analyst coverage. In this respect, disclo-
sure serves to limit the monitoring and agency costs
resulting from the existence of a greater number of
shareholders. Reinforcing the previous arguments,
Singhvi and Desai (1971), Cooke (1989), Hossain et
al. (1994, 1995) and Robb et al. (2001) find
international listing status to be a significant deter-
minant of the voluntary disclosure level. Thus, we
hypothesize that:
H5: There is a positive significant relationship
between CSR disclosure and international listing.
Media exposure
Legitimacy theory research extends to examining the
role media coverage plays in increasing the public
policy pressures faced by companies (Patten, 2002b).
The total amount of media coverage raises the firm’s
visibility, inviting further public attention and scru-
tiny. The media can play an important role in
mobilizing social movements such as environmental
interest groups. In doing so, it becomes part of the
institution-building process, shaping the norms of
acceptable and legitimate CSR practices. According
to Simon (1992), the media is the main source of
environmental information. The media not only
plays a passive role in shaping institutional norms, but
also a more active one by choosing the stories worth
reporting and framing them to reflect editorial values.
Empirical studies have shown that the media has been
particularly influential on corporate envi-
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ronmental responses (Bansal and Clelland, 2004;
Bansal and Roth, 2000; Bowen, 2000; Henriques
and Sadorsky, 1996). Based on these arguments, the
following hypothesis is tested:
H6: There is a positive significant relationship
between CSR disclosure and media exposure.
Leverage
Within the context of the agency theory, Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argue that more highly leveraged
firms disclose voluntary information in order to
reduce their agency costs and, as a result, their cost of
capital. However, Brammer and Pavelin (2008)
sustain that a low degree of leverage ensures that
creditor stakeholders will exert less pressure to
constrain managers’ discretion over CSR activities,
which are only indirectly linked to the financial
success of the firm. Purushothaman et al. (2000) also
predict a negative relationship between leverage and
CSR disclosure in that companies with high leverage
may have closer relationships with their creditors and
use other means to disclose social responsibility
information. Thus, we do not make any a priori
assumption about the sign of the association between
CSR disclosure and leverage. The following
hypothesis is thus tested:
H7: There is a significant relationship between
CSR disclosure and leverage.1
Data and method of estimation
CSR ratings: the dependent variable
Our data on CSR disclosure ratings come from the
Observatory on corporate social responsibility
(OCSR). This is an association integrated by four-
teen organizations that represent civil society,
NGOs, trade unions, and consumer organizations. It
is a network that fosters participation and coopera-
tion between social organizations that, from different
points of view, are interested in CSR. The OCSR
issues each year a very exhaustive report on CSR
disclosures by Spanish listed firms included in the
IBEX35 index, which comprises the largest 35 firms
in terms of market capitalization. Each of the cov-
ered firms is assigned a numerical rating (ranging
from 0 to 4 in a continuous scale) based on the
adherence of their CSR disclosures to the following
rules/recommendations: (a) Global Reporting Ini-
tiative (GRI)’s Guidelines (G2 and G3); (b) United
Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights [U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003)]; (c) AA1000
Accountability Principles issued by the Institute of
Social and Ethical AccountAbility); (d) New Eco-
nomics Foundation (NEF) Principles and (e) Cor-
porate Governance recommendations issued by the
Spanish stock market regulator and, in the case of
US cross-listed firms, the Sarbanes-Oxley Law. We
focus on the following three ratings reported by the
OCSR:
a) Total CSR score (TCSR), which captures the
overall adherence of a firm’s CSR disclosure
practices to the previous rules/recommenda-
tions;
b) CSR Content Rating (CR), which evaluates
the concordance of the information provided
by a firm to the recommendations reported in:






– labor practices and decent work
– society
– product responsibility
• United Nations Norms on the Responsibili-
ties of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights (especially in the fields of protection
of consumer rights and corruption);
c) CSR Management Systems Rating (MSR),
which evaluates the adherence of the pro-
cesses and management systems in the CSR
area to those outlined in:
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• GRI’s Profile section.
• GRI’s Principles (relevance/materiality,
stakeholder inclusiveness, reliability/audit-
ability, neutrality, sustainability context,
accuracy, comparability, clarity, complete-
ness, timeliness, transparency).
• AA1000 Principles (completeness, material-
ity, regularity and timeliness, quality assur-
ance, information quality, embeddedness,
continuous improvement, accessibility).
• NEF’s Principles (inclusivity, completeness,
comparability, embeddedness, disclosure,




To develop a measure of the companies’ media
exposure, the number of articles in the two main
Spanish business newspapers (‘Expansión’ and
‘Actualidad Económica’) was counted. Company
exposure was measured by using the search facilities
present on the web pages of those newspapers for
each of the 2 years analyzed (2005 and 2006).2
Profitability
In order to measure corporate performance, either
accounting- or market-based measures can be used.
In contrast with accounting-based measures, market-
based measures are less subject to bias by managerial
manipulation and they do not rely on past perfor-
mance (McGuire et al., 1988). However, they are
based on investors’ viewpoints on company perfor-
mance, thus ignoring other important stakeholder
groups. This is the main reason for adopting an
accounting-based variable in our paper, such as
return on assets (ROA) (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989;
Bewley and Li, 2000; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008;
Cormier et al., 2004; Patten, 1991).
Industry sensitivity
In this study, ‘‘more sensitive’’ industries are con-
sidered to be those with more risk of being criticized
in CSR matters because of their activities involving
higher risk of environmental impact. Based on prior
literature, the following ‘‘more sensitive’’ sectors are
identified: mining, oil and gas, chemicals, forestry
and paper, steel and other metals, electricity, gas
distribution, and water. All others are considered as
‘‘less sensitive.’’ A one/zero variable is used to des-
ignate companies from these industries: one if the
company is from a more sensitive industry and zero
if it is from a less sensitive industry.
International listing
International listing is measured by the number of
foreing stock markets in which the firm is listed.
Company size
Following prior research, size is measured as the
natural logarithm of market capitalization.3
Ownership concentration
This variable is measured from data concerning
significant shareholdings from 2005 and 2006 annual
reports of the sample companies. Thus, if a firm has a
majority shareholder we assign it a value of 1 and if
not it is assigned a zero value.
Leverage
This variable is measured as long-term debt/book
value of equity (Cormier et al., 2005).4
Sample
Our sample comprises those firms covered by the
OCSR report, i.e., Spanish firms listed on the
Madrid Stock Exchange and included in
the IBEX35 index. However, due to the fact that
most of our explanatory variables are based on
accounting data, we have excluded financial firms
because of the particular characteristics of their
accounting system. Moreover, since all firms under
study present consolidated accounts and they had
to be prepared in accordance with International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the
IASB from 2005 onward – Regulation 1606/2002 of
the European Commission – we have chosen fiscal
years 2005 and 2006 so as to ensure comparability in
accounting data. After eliminating firms with
extreme values for some of the explanatory variables,
the final sample comprises 46 observations.5
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Empirical models
The statistical analysis conducted in this study
includes the use of linear regression models to ana-
lyze the relationship between CSR ratings and each
of the influencing factors referred to in the previous
section. The three estimated models differ in their
dependent variables: Total CSR (TSCR), CSR
Content Rating (CR), and CSR Management Sys-
tems Rating (MSR). The approach adopted in the
empirical analysis is summarized by the following
general form of the models:
CSR ratingi ! b0 " b1MEi " b2ILi " b3INDi
" b4SIZEi " b5OWNERi
" b6ROAi " b7LEVi " ei
where, ME: media exposure; IL: International list-
ing; IND: Industry environmental sensitivity;
SIZE: Firm’s size; OWNER: Ownership concen-
tration; ROA: Profitability (return on assets); LEV:
Leverage.
Results
Table I reports the descriptive statistics of the
dependent and independent variables considered in
our study. It can be seen a high variability in CSR
practices across Spanish listed firms, as the total CSR
rating varies from 0.170 to 1.940. As the maximum
value is 4, we can assert that the degree of infor-
mation on CSR by Spanish listed firms is still rather
low.
Table II reports the correlation coefficients among
our set of independent variables. It can be seen that
some correlations are statistically significant at a 1%
level, such as those between size and media exposure
(q = 0.599), industry and leverage (q = - 0.465) and 
leverage and return on assets (q = - 0.526). How-
ever, none of the variance inflation factors (VIFs)
– not reported – exceed the critical value of 10. Thus,
it can be said that multicollinearity is not a serious
problem in our study.
Table III reports the mean values of the explan-
atory variables under analysis across the several CSR
disclosure ratings for both firms with a rating higher
than the median and those with a rating lower than
the median. To test the statistical significance of the
mean differences in the explanatory variables
between both groups of firms, we perform a t-test (if
the variable is normally distributed) and a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test (if the variable is non-normally
distributed). It can be observed that firms with a
total CSR rating higher than the median operate in a
more environmentally sensitive industry (p = 0.008),
have a higher media exposure (p = 0.000), a larger
size (p = 0.010), and a less concentrated ownership
(p = 0.004), as compared to those firms with a CSR
rating lower than the median. However, although
firms disclosing more on CSR activities are listed on a
higher number of foreign stock markets, have a lower
leverage and are more profitable, these differences are
not significantly different, at a 5% level, between
both groups of firms. It should be noted that the
results are generally consistent across the other two
CSR ratings.
Table IV reports the results of regressing the
explanatory factors on the various CSR ratings. The
first rows of each panel present the results of
regressing the explanatory factors one by one on the
CSR ratings, while the last row combines all the
explanatory variables together. When considered
individually, it can be seen that firms with higher
CSR ratings present a statistically significant larger
size, and a higher media exposure. Also, firms with
higher CSR ratings belong to more environmentally
sensitive industries, and are listed in a higher number
of foreign stock markets. As regards ownership
structure, firms with higher CSR ratings have a less
concentrated ownership. However, neither ROA
nor leverage seem to explain differences in CSR
disclosure practices between Spanish listed firms. In
terms of R2, the most influential variable for 
explaining firms’ variation in total CSR ratings is
media exposure (R2 = 0.338), followed by size 
(R2 = 0.186) and industry (R2 = 0.164). When 
pulling all the explanatory factors together, they
explain between 42.9% and 47.5% of the variation of
the several CSR ratings. The variables that are sta-
tistically significant for all the CSR ratings are those
related to public or social visibility (i.e., size, media
exposure, and industry environmental sensitivity).
According to these results, it seems that the legiti-
macy theory is the most relevant theory for
explaining CSR disclosure practices of Spanish listed
firms. Thus, Spanish firms report on CSR activities
in order to respond to public pressures and build or
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sustain corporate legitimacy. In this regard, CSR
disclosure can be viewed as a constructed image or
symbolic impression of itself that a firm is conveying
to the outside world to control its political or eco-
nomic position (Neu et al., 1998).
Concluding remarks
The goal of this study is to analyze whether a
number of firm and industry characteristics, as well
as media exposure, are potential determinants of
CSR disclosure practices by Spanish listed firms.
Empirical studies have shown that CSR disclosure
activism varies across companies, industries, and time
(Gray et al., 1995, 2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996).
They have also shown this behavior to be
importantly and systematically determined by a
variety of firm and industry characteristics that
influence the relative costs and benefits of disclosing
such information (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989;
Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Cormier et al., 2005;
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002a, b).
TABLE I
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables
Variable Mean Median SD Minimun Maximum
Dependent variables
TCSR 1.150 1.245 0.485 0.170 1.940
CR 0.835 0.855 0.491 0.020 1.670
MSR 1.194 1.315 0.614 0.020 2.210
Independent variables
ME 69.369 43.000 57.047 6.000 268.000
IL 5.783 6.000 3.039 1.000 12.000
IND 0.456 0.000 0.504 0.000 1.000
SIZE 15.935 15.965 0.936 14.280 18.190
OWNER 0.283 0.000 0.455 0.000 1.000
ROA 0.052 0.047 0.033 0.003 0.174
LEV 3.804 3.032 2.769 0.659 13.789
Notes: TCSR: Total corporate social responsibility index; CR: CSR Content rating; MSI: CSR Management Systems
rating; ME: Media exposure; IL: International listing; IND: Industry environmental sensitivity; SIZE: Firm’s size;
OWNER: Ownership concentration; ROA: Return on assets; LEV: Long-term debt/book value of equity. See variables
measurement in the text.
TABLE II
Correlation coefficients among independent variables
ME IL IND SIZE OWNER ROA LEV
ME 0.345* 0.370* 0.599** -0.307* 0.018 -0.071
IL -0.021 0.325* 0.045 0.062 0.076
IND 0.063 -0.381** 0.035 -0.465**
SIZE -0.093 0.317* 0.059
OWNER 0.043 0.302*
ROA -0.526**
Notes: ME: Media exposure; IL: International listing; IND: Industry environmental sensitivity; SIZE: Firm’s size;
OWNER: Ownership concentration; ROA: Return on assets; LEV: Long-term debt/book value of equity. See variables
measurement in the text.
*Significant at a 5% level, **Significant at a 1% level.
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Our findings evidence that firms with higher CSR
ratings present a statistically significant larger size and
a higher media exposure, and belong to more envi-
ronmentally sensitive industries, as compared to firms
with lower CSR ratings. However, neither profit-
ability nor leverage seem to explain differences in
CSR disclosure practices between Spanish listed
firms. The most influential variable for explaining
firms’ variation in CSR ratings is media exposure,
followed by size and industry. Therefore, it seems that
the legitimacy theory, as captured by those variables
related to public or social visibility, is the most rele-
vant theory for explaining CSR disclosure practices
of Spanish listed firms. Thus, Spanish firms report on
CSR activities mainly to act and be seen acting within
the bounds of what is considered acceptable accord-
ing to the expectations of stakeholders on how their
operations should be conducted.
Moreover, the results of this study suggest that
factors which influence CSR practices of Spanish
listed companies are not significantly different than
those which influence CSR of companies in other
TABLE III
Differences in the value of the explanatory variables between firms with higher and lower CSR ratings
Variables Firms with TCSR > median Firms with TCSR < median Difference (p-value in parentheses)
Panel A: Total CSR rating (TCSR)
ME 98.522 40.217 58.305 (0.000)
IL 6.304 5.261 1.043 (0.076)
IND 0.652 0.261 0.391 (0.008)
SIZE 16.287 15.583 0.704 (0.010)
OWNER 0.087 0.478 -0.391 (0.004)
ROA 0.057 0.047 0.010 (0.095)
LEV 3.016 4.592 -1.576 (0.191)
Variables Firms with CR > median Firms with CR < median Difference (p-value in parentheses)
Panel B: CSR Content Rating (CR)
ME 102.261 36.478 65.783 (0.000)
IL 6.739 4.826 1.913 (0.031)
IND 0.739 0.174 0.565 (0.000)
SIZE 16.302 15.568 0.734 (0.007)
OWNER 0.217 0.348 -0.131 (0.331)
ROA 0.055 0.049 0.006 (0.286)
LEV 3.468 4.139 -0.671 (0.448)
Variables Firms with MSR > median Firms with MSR < median Difference (p-value in parentheses)
Panel C: CSR Management Systems Rating (MSR)
ME 99.087 39.652 59.435 (0.000)
IL 6.304 5.261 1.043 (0.250)
IND 0.696 0.217 0.479 (0.001)
SIZE 16.274 15.596 0.678 (0.013)
OWNER 0.087 0.478 -0.391 (0.004)
ROA 0.057 0.047 0.010 (0.062)
LEV 2.742 4.865 -2.123 (0.063)
Notes: ME: Media exposure; IL: International listing; IND: Industry environmental sensitivity; SIZE: Firm’s size;
OWNER: Ownership concentration; ROA: Return on assets; LEV: Long-term debt/book value of equity. See variables























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































environments. This is consistent with the results of
Cormier and Magnan (2003), which lead them to
suggest that the similitude in the way in which dis-
closure strategies are determined, irrespective of a
given country’s socio-cultural environment, is ‘‘an
illustration of the strong impact of globalised stock
markets on fostering convergence in corporate
practices’’ (2003, p. 58).
Notes
1 Results are similar if a market-based measure of risk,
such as beta, is used instead of leverage in the regression
models.
2 Most of the literature in this area assumes a contem-
porary relationship between media exposure and CSR
disclosure (e.g., Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Cormier et al.,
2004, 2005). But this relationship could be prob-ably
delayed, i.e., more media coverage one year could result in
more CSR disclosure in future years. In order to test this
delayed relationship, I have re-estimated the models
introducing the variable ‘Media exposure’ (ME) with a
one-year lag (MEt-1). However, this lagged var-iable has
not turned out to be statistically significant. This result
could be due to the high correlation (q = 0.832) between 
media exposure in year t (MEt) and year t - 1 (MEt-1), 
i.e., those firms with a high media coverage in one period
tend also to be highly followed by media in the following
period.
3 Results are similar is size is proxied by the log of
total assets.
4 If leverage is measured by the ratio total debt/total
assets the results remain unchanged.
5 Taking every year as a separate observation may
aggravate the problem of extreme values. In order to
test the existence of extreme observations that could
unduly influence our results, I have applied the most
usual diagnostic tests for detecting outliers, such as the
studentized residuals, the Cook’s D, DF-betas, and least
absolute values (LAV). These additional tests indicate
that the main results of our study are not driven by
outliers.
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